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TOWARDS A COHERENT AND CONSISTENT 
FRAMEWORK FOR TREATMENT OF 
CONFIDENTIAL SUPERVISORY INFORMATION 
CLIFFORD S. STANFORD* 
 
“It’s not me who can’t keep a secret.  It’s the people I tell that 
can’t.” Abraham Lincoln1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, new regulators, new rules, enhanced supervisory 
and enforcement authority, and intensive public scrutiny of the 
effectiveness of banking supervision have all amplified the longstanding 
tensions and ambiguities that emerge from the exchange of information 
critical to effective bank supervision, including “confidential supervisory 
information” (“CSI”).  The dynamics of supervisory dialogue involve 
everything from routine examination matters to complex public 
enforcement investigations.  The D.C. Circuit described the context from 
which CSI emerges as follows: 
   
Bank safety and soundness supervision is an iterative 
process of comment by the regulators and response by the 
bank. The success of the supervision therefore depends 
vitally upon the quality of communication between the 
regulated banking firm and the bank regulatory agency. 
This relationship is both extensive and informal.  It is 
extensive in that bank examiners concern themselves 
with all manner of a bank’s affairs:  Not only the 
classification of assets and the review of financial 
 
*Cliff Stanford is a Partner with Alston & Bird, where he chairs the firm’s bank regulatory 
practice.  Mr. Stanford was formerly an official with the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.  
Mr. Stanford thanks students Roy G. Dixon, III, John H. Hykes, Joanne Wu, and Richard W. 
Gittings, and Professor Lissa L. Broome for their assistance in preparing this article. 
 1. GOODREADS, https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/69197-it-s-not-me-who-can-t-k 
eep-a-secret-it-s-the (last visited Jan. 22, 2018). 
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transactions, but also the adequacy of security systems 
and of internal reporting requirements, and even the 
quality of managerial personnel are of concern to the 
examiners.2 
 
As a policy matter, concerns about the treatment of CSI that 
emerge from this supervisory dialogue must be reconciled with legal 
privileges and the desirability of open government.  These interrelated 
concerns can complicate the dialogue between a supervised institution 
and its supervisors.  There are traps for the unwary for institutions that 
are insufficiently mindful of how CSI is shared and maintained, ranging 
from reputational damage and diminished competitive posture, to loss of 
legal privilege and even to civil or criminal sanction.  The agencies have 
such elevated concerns about the improper use or disclosure of CSI that 
enforcement actions, civil penalties, and even criminal referrals will be 
used as a deterrent and punishment.  Enforcement actions can serve as 
definitional guardrails in understanding the scope of permitted use of 
CSI, but many questions remain.3   
For example, in 1997, Asahi Bank, Ltd., then one of Japan’s 
largest banks, consented to an order issued by the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System (“Board”) to pay a $5 million civil money 
penalty, in part, for the misuse of CSI by its New York branch employees, 
who allegedly accessed sealed boxes of documents stored by examiners 
at Asahi Bank’s offices.  No financial impropriety was alleged to have 
resulted from the improper access.  In addition to its civil enforcement 
action, the Board referred the matter to the Justice Department.4 
In 2012, the National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”) 
banned a credit union director from serving on any NCUA-insured credit 
union board, for having revealed the supervisory rating of a credit union 
 
 2. In re Subpoena Served Upon the Comptroller of Currency, and Sec’y of the Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 967 F.2d 630, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 3. The principle “ex facto jus oritur” (the law arises from the facts) may be as useful as 
any in derivation of a working understanding of CSI. 
 4. The bank employees’ access to the CSI was part of larger concerns about the bank’s 
behavior.  See The Asahi Bank, LTD., Nos. 96-023-B-FB, 96-023-B-FBR 1997 WL 61521, 
at *1 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Feb. 13, 1997) (“Asahi and the New York 
Branch are hereby assessed and shall pay, in settlement of these proceedings, a civil money 
penalty in the amount of $5 million.”). 
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led by a nominee for the NCUA’s governing board.5  In this case, the 
NCUA couched its enforcement action and prohibition order as 
pertaining to a breach of fiduciary duty by the director. 
Most recently, a former Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
examiner and a Goldman Sachs banker each pled guilty to a misdemeanor 
charge of theft of government property and consented to an order banning 
each from banking.  In this case, the banker wrongfully obtained 
approximately thirty-five documents containing CSI from his former 
subordinate at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  The banker then 
used those documents for purposes of furthering his career interests at 
Goldman Sachs by sharing those documents within the company, 
including documents relating to examinations of a bank that Goldman 
Sachs was advising about a potential transaction.  In this case, upon 
learning of these issues, Goldman Sachs fired the banker as well as a 
managing director with supervisory responsibility, and self-disclosed the 
misuse of CSI to its regulators.  Despite these actions, Goldman Sachs 
paid a $50 million fine to the New York Department of Financial 
Services, agreed to a three-year abstention from any consulting 
arrangements that would require disclosure of CSI under New York law, 
and further agreed to pay a $36 million fine to the Board.  The Board’s 
Order asserted that the firm had inadequate policies, training, controls, 
and risk management oversight related to handling of CSI, and the Board 
required implementation of an enhanced compliance program pertaining 
to CSI.6  Further, the Board also brought a civil enforcement action 
against the managing director also fired by Goldman Sachs, alleging 
violations of law as well as breach of fiduciary duty.7 
 
 5. See James M. Talbert, No. 12-0015-R2 (Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd. Mar. 9, 2012) 
(“[T]he NCUAB issues this order and prohibits Talbert from participating in any manner in 
the conduct of the affairs of any federally-insured credit union and from continuing or 
commencing to hold any office, or participate in any manner, in the conduct of the affairs of 
any other institution or agency described in Section 206(g)(7) of the FCUA . . . .”); NCUA 
Bars Former DC FCU Board Member, NAT’L CREDIT UNION ADMIN. (Mar. 28, 2012), https:/
/www.ncua.gov/newsroom/Pages/NW20120328Talbert.aspx. 
 6. See The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Nos. 16-011-BH-C, 16-011-CMP-HC (Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Aug. 2, 2016) (“[T]he Firm lacked adequate policies and 
procedures designed to detect or prevent the unauthorized dissemination and use of 
confidential supervisory information belonging to the Board of Governors and other banking 
regulators, which resulted in legal and reputational risks to the Firm. . . .”). 
 7. See Joseph Jiampietro, Nos. 16-012-E-1, 16-012-CMP-1 (Bd. of Governors of the 
Fed. Reserve Sys. Aug. 2, 2016) (showing the factual allegations of the Board’s notice 
articulate a detailed review of the Board’s findings that Mr. Jiampietro was aware of the 
restrictions on use of CSI, but allegedly fostered a culture over a course of several years that 
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Considering the examples above, there are clearly lessons to be 
learned.  First, the agencies take improper disclosures of CSI seriously, 
and will bring civil actions and make criminal referrals in appropriate 
instances.  Disclosure or use of CSI, except as expressly permitted by the 
appropriate agency, may be subject to criminal penalties.8  Further, as 
seen in the Goldman Sachs Order9 and other enforcement actions, the 
agencies expect banks to have appropriate compliance programs in place 
to ensure that CSI is not misused.  However, despite the seriousness of 
these issues, the rules governing CSI are disparate and in some cases 
inconsistent, forcing some institutions to consider how to reconcile 
conflicting regulatory expectations.   
Larger, more complex banking institutions may have supervisory 
relationships or enforcement-related dialogue with the Board, the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (“CFPB”), the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), the Department 
of Justice (“DOJ”), the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), state regulators 
and tax authorities, state attorneys general, foreign regulators, and others.  
In addition, banks have a choice of charter and of federal prudential 
supervisor, and the degree of clarity and permissiveness of the agency’s 
rules pertaining to CSI may be a factor in regulatory arbitrage. 
Further reflecting the importance of this issue, definitions and 
permissible uses of CSI have significance in other contexts beyond the 
scope of this article.  For the distinct but related purposes of the federal 
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), matters that are “contained in or 
related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on 
behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or 
supervision of financial institutions” are exempt from disclosure to the 
public by the federal government.10  The same policy underpins the 
 
led to the misuse of CSI within the company, including use of CSI in “pitch” materials to 
potential clients). 
 8. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2016). 
 9. See The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., No. 16-011-BH-C, 16-011-CMP-HC (Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 2016) (“[T]he Firm shall submit to the Board of 
Governors an acceptable written plan, and timeline for implementation, to enhance the 
effectiveness of the internal controls and compliance functions regarding the identification, 
monitoring, and control of confidential supervisory information.”).  
 10. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (2016) (discussing “Exemption 8”).  Each of the agencies has 
promulgated rules implementing the FOIA.  Most states have similar “sunshine” or open 
  
2018] COHERENT AND CONSISTENT TREATMENT OF CSI 45 
common law “bank examiner privilege,” which may be asserted by the 
agencies to shield disclosure of CSI as an evidentiary matter in the 
context of litigation.11  Separately, CSI may contain communications 
subject to legal privilege, such that institutions must understand whether 
statutory protections pertaining to “selective waiver” preserve the 
privileged nature of those communications.12   
Against this backdrop, this article examines the definitions of CSI 
and the treatment of confidential communications between banks13 and 
their supervisors—the Board, the OCC, the FDIC, as well as with the 
CFPB—in the exercise of each agency’s supervisory and enforcement 
powers.  It proceeds in five parts.  Part II discusses the agency definitions 
of CSI, both in an abstract sense and as the rules limit permitted use and 
disclosure.14  Part III provides illustrative examples of the implications of 
the agencies’ disparate rules.15  Part IV posits whether market signals 
have eroded the veil of secrecy afforded to certain key elements of CSI.16  
 
government laws governing state agencies, including state bank supervisors.  An exposition 
of these state laws is beyond the scope of this article.  See, e.g., The Open Government Guide, 
THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/ogg/index.php 
(listing a complete compendium of information on each state’s open records and open 
meetings laws). 
 11. See, e.g., In re Subpoena Served Upon the Comptroller of Currency, and Sec’y of the 
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 967 F.2d 630, at 634 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“Bank 
management must be open and forthcoming in response to the inquiries of bank examiners, 
and the examiners must in turn be frank in expressing their concerns about the bank.  These 
conditions simply could not be met as well if communications between the bank and its 
regulators were not privileged.”). 
 12. Federal law provides for “selective waiver,” such that no waiver results from 
compelled or voluntary disclosure to any federal banking agency, the CFPB, a state bank 
supervisor, or a foreign banking authority in the context of any supervisory or regulatory 
process.  See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(x) (2016) (discussing privileges not affected by disclosure to 
banking agency or supervisor).  Certain of these agencies may, in turn, share privileged 
information with certain other agencies without waiving privilege.  12 U.S.C. § 1821(t) 
(2016).  However, these statutes are not drafted of whole cloth.  See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, 
The Attorney-Client Privilege – Selective Compulsion, Selective Waiver, and Selective 
Disclosure:  Is Bank Regulation Exceptional?, 2013 J. PROF. LAW. 85, 88 (2013) (“This state 
of affairs raises questions about the wisdom of the federal laws and regulatory policies. . . .”). 
 13. For purposes of simplicity, this article uses the term “bank” to mean any depository 
institution chartered by a state or by the OCC, any foreign banking organization operating in 
the United States, and the U.S. subsidiaries or affiliates of any of the foregoing.  While this 
article focuses on banks, the same principles apply generally to credit unions in their 
relationships with the NCUA or to state credit union regulators.  Further, certain non-bank 
firms are also subject to similar supervision by the CFPB, or as a result of the oversight of 
third party service providers by the agencies. 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. See infra Part IV. 
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Finally, Part V presents considerations for potential reform.17  While 
many states have their own rules pertaining to CSI, further complicating 
the landscape, a complete analysis of those rules is beyond the scope of 
this article.  Throughout, the article identifies some suggested 
opportunities for reform, and discusses some common practical concerns 
that arise from supervisory discourse.18   
II. CONFIDENTIAL SUPERVISORY INFORMATION 
A. Definitions in the Abstract 
CSI can generally be defined as information prepared for, by or 
on behalf of, or for the use of a bank’s supervisors.  At its core, this 
includes supervisory ratings, examination reports and supervisory letters, 
and the iterative back-and-forth that emerges as banks are subject to 
regulatory supervision.  Beyond these axiomatic points, however, the 
Board, OCC, FDIC, and CFPB each have distinct definitions and 
requirements.  In many cases, what constitutes CSI must be assessed 
under a “know it when you see it” standard, but the agencies have 




(1) Confidential supervisory information means: 
 
(i) Exempt information19 consisting of reports of 
examination, inspection and visitation, confidential 
operating and condition reports, and any information derived 
from, related to, or contained in such reports; 
 
(ii) Information gathered by the Board in the course of any 
 
 17. See infra Part V. 
 18. The agencies also impose information security safeguards, premised on the protection 
of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information.  In addition, privacy law, 
including the protection of certain consumer information, presents an entirely separate but 
related discipline that also brings forth a range of complex concerns that can bleed into how 
an institution approaches protection of sensitive information such as CSI. 
 19. Reflective of the Board’s role in coordinated supervision of state-chartered, Federal 
Reserve member banks, “exempt information” is defined by the Board to include any 
information exempt under Exemption 8, but expanded to include information contained in or 
related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the 
use of “a state financial institution supervisory agency.”  12 C.F.R. § 261.14(a)(8) (2017). 
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investigation, suspicious activity report,20 cease-and-desist 
orders, civil money penalty enforcement orders, suspension, 
removal or prohibition orders, or other orders or actions 
under [enumerated laws pursuant to which the Board has 
supervisory or enforcement authority]; except— 
 
(A) Such final orders, amendments, or modifications of final 
orders, or other actions or documents that are specifically 
required to be published or made available to the public 
pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 1818(u),21 or other applicable law, 
including the record of litigated proceedings; and 
  
(B) The public section of Community Reinvestment Act 




(iii) Any documents prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use 
of the Board, a Federal Reserve Bank, a federal or state 
financial institutions supervisory agency, or a bank or bank 
holding company or other supervised financial institution. 
 
(2) Confidential supervisory information does not include 
documents prepared by a supervised financial institution for 
 
 20. Suspicious activity reports, or “SARs,” pertain to reports of suspicious potential 
criminal activity by banks and others, and are subject to an independent scheme of law to 
restrict their disclosure, derived from the Bank Secrecy Act.  31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2016), et seq.; 
12 C.F.R. §§ 208.62, 211.5(k), 211.24(f), 225.4(f) (2017) (pertaining to reports prescribed by 
the Board); 12 C.F.R. Part 353 (2017) (requiring notifying the FDIC); 12 C.F.R. Part 748 
(2017) (pertaining to credit unions notifying the NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (2017) (requiring 
all national banks licensed or chartered by the OCC to comply); 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320 (2017) 
(requiring SARs to be filed with FinCEN).  Disclosure of SARs other than to law enforcement, 
to the supervisory agencies, or as otherwise expressly permitted, is subject to criminal 
sanction.  See 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (2016) (setting forth criminal penalties).  Courts also 
recognize a “SAR privilege” on similar grounds as bank examination privilege. 
 21. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(u) (2016) provides for public disclosure of formal enforcement 
actions such as written agreements, unless determined to be contrary to the public interest, of 
all final orders resulting from any administrative enforcement proceeding, and any 
modification or termination of the foregoing.  Section 1818(u) further provides for the 
publication of hearing transcripts, subject to the agency’s filing of documents under seal as 
disclosure is determined by the agency to be “contrary to the public interest.”  Notably, the 
statute does not authorize the withholding, or to prohibit the disclosure, of any information to 
Congress. 
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its own business purposes and that are in its possession.22 
OCC (b) Non-public OCC information: 
 
(1) Means information that the OCC is not required to release 
under the FOIA . . . or that the OCC has not yet published or 
made available pursuant to [Section 1818(u)] and includes: 
 
(i) A record created or obtained: 
 
(A) By the OCC in connection with the OCC’s performance 
of its responsibilities, such as a record concerning 
supervision, licensing, regulation, and examination of a 
national bank, a Federal savings association, a bank holding 
company, a savings and loan holding company, or an 
affiliate; or 
 
(B) By the OTS23 in connection with the OTS’s performance 
of its responsibilities, such as a record concerning 
supervision, licensing, regulation, and examination of a 
Federal savings association, a savings and loan holding 
company, or an affiliate; 
 
(ii) A record compiled by the OCC or the OTS in connection 
with either agency’s  enforcement responsibilities; 
 
(iii) A report of examination, supervisory correspondence, an 
investigatory file compiled by the OCC or OTS in connection 
with an investigation, and any internal agency memorandum, 
whether the information is in the possession of the OCC or 
some other individual or entity; 
 
(iv) Confidential OCC information obtained by a third party 
or otherwise incorporated in the records of a third party, 
including another government agency; 
 
 
 22. 12 C.F.R. § 261.2(c) (2017) (emphasis added). 
 23. The former Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) was absorbed by the OCC as a 
result of Dodd-Frank.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank”) § 312, 12 U.S.C. § 5412 (2016). 
  
2018] COHERENT AND CONSISTENT TREATMENT OF CSI 49 
(v) Testimony from, or an interview with, a current or former 
OCC employee, officer, or agent or a former OTS employee, 
officer, or agent concerning information acquired by that 
person in the course of his or her performance of official 
duties with the OCC or OTS or due to that person’s official 
status at the OCC or OTS; and 
 
(vi) Confidential information relating to operating and no 
longer operating national banks, Federal savings 
associations, and savings and loan holding companies as well 
as their subsidiaries and their affiliates. 
 
(2) Is the property of the Comptroller.24 
 
FDIC [Confidential supervisory information includes:] 
 
Records that are contained in or related to examination, 
operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or 
for the use of the FDIC or any agency responsible for the 
regulation or supervision of financial institutions.25 
 
CFPB (1) Confidential supervisory information means: 
 
(i) Reports of examination, inspection and visitation, non-
public operating, condition, and compliance reports, and any 
information contained in, derived from, or related to such 
reports; 
 
(ii) Any documents, including reports of examination, 
prepared by, or on behalf of, or for the use of the CFPB or 
any other Federal, State, or foreign government agency in the 
exercise of supervisory authority over a financial institution, 
 
 24. 12 C.F.R. § 4.32(b) (2017). 
 25. 12 C.F.R. § 309.5(g)(8) (2017).  This is the FDIC’s implementation of Exemption 8.  
The agency provides no other definition by regulation, but does expound upon the treatment 
of supervisory ratings as CSI in an advisory letter published by the Board, OCC, FDIC, and 
OTS.  See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 13-2005, INTERAGENCY ADVISORY 
ON THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE SUPERVISORY RATING AND OTHER NONPUBLIC SUPERVISORY 
INFORMATION (2005) [hereinafter 2005 INTERAGENCY ADVISORY] (reminding all banking 
organizations of the prohibition to disclose their CAMELS rating). 
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and any information derived from such documents; 
 
(iii) Any communications between the CFPB and a 
supervised financial institution or a Federal, State, or foreign 
government agency related to the CFPB’s supervision of the 
institution; 
 
(iv) any information provided to the CFPB by a financial 
institution to enable the CFPB to monitor for risks to 
consumers in the offering or provision of consumer financial 
products or services, or to assess whether an institution 
should be considered a covered person, as that term is 
defined by 12 U.S.C. 5481, or is subject to the CFPB’s 
supervisory authority; and/or 
 
(v) Information that is exempt from disclosure pursuant to 
[Exemption 8]. 
 
(2) Confidential supervisory information does not include 
documents prepared by a financial institution for its own 
business purposes and that the CFPB does not possess.26 
 
As can be seen by the preceding definitions, there is a 
fundamental dissimilarity in the definition of what constitutes CSI among 
the agencies.  There are a range of questions that emerge.  What 
constitutes information “derived from” or “related to” an examination 
report?  Is any information developed by a bank in response to an 
examination finding considered CSI?  Is it the case that information may 
be CSI, but not also covered by Exemption 8 for FOIA purposes?  Or, are 
these equivalent such that case law developing the coverage of 
Exemption 8 can inform what is to be treated as CSI?  Should a banking 
group with many regulators adopt the most conservative definition?  
Which one is that?  Should the bank synthesize the definitions to derive 
its own?  What are the risks of that?   
Should a bank whose primary federal supervisor is the FDIC look 
to the other agencies’ definitions for greater certainty?  Does the FDIC’s 
definition relate to any supervisory dialogue outside of examination 
 
 26. 12 C.F.R. § 1070.2(i) (2017) (emphasis added). 
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reports?  Does it clearly include state examination materials, as the 
Board’s rule does?  What about information provided to the FDIC in the 
context of an applications process, such as for a merger or a new activity, 
which are not clearly examination, operating, or condition reports? 
With regard to interagency communications, the CFPB makes it 
clear that interagency communications pertaining to the CFPB’s 
supervision of an institution constitute CSI.  The Board includes any 
documents prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of the Board, a Federal 
Reserve Bank, a federal or state financial institutions supervisory agency, 
but does not—as the CFPB does—include any foreign government 
agency.27  The OCC only includes any confidential OCC information 
obtained by another agency.  The FDIC is silent on this issue. 
When the Board and the CFPB exclude documents prepared by 
the bank for its own business purposes, the Board references documents 
that are in the bank’s possession, but the CFPB references documents that 
are not in the CFPB’s possession.  If, for example, a large organization 
obtains a third party review of its compliance management system for 
business purposes, and the report is also provided to the Board and the 
CFPB upon supervisory request, is that information only CSI for so long 
as it is “possessed” by the agency?  What does this mean in the context 
of shared databases of documents and information?  Which agency’s 
information is it?   
In many ways, these and other questions and apparent 
inconsistencies in definitions may seem academic, but they take on real 
world meaning in the context of civil or criminal supervisory sanction for 
misuse of CSI. 
B. Definitions Based Upon Usage and Context 
While the agencies have each defined CSI differently in their 
rules, ambiguities about CSI also emerge in the context of determining 
 
 27. Note that other law specifically covers the interagency sharing of information with 
the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission, for purposes of antitrust analysis 
in the context of a merger review.  See 12 U.S.C. § 1828b (2016) (“To the extent not prohibited 
by other law, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Director of the Office of Thrift 
Supervision, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System shall make available to the Attorney General and the Federal Trade 
Commission any data in the possession of any such banking agency that the antitrust agency 
deems necessary for antitrust review of any transaction requiring notice to any such antitrust 
agency or the approval of such agency. . . .”). 
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how it is used, by whom, and for what purpose.  Again, these ambiguities 
are brought into sharp focus by the threat of civil penalties and potentially 
criminal sanctions for unlawful use or disclosure.  An understanding of 
the agency CSI rules, and how they are applied, is therefore a significant 
practical concern for each bank.    
Likely reflective of the emerging ubiquity of electronic data, as 
well as instances of misuse of CSI, the federal prudential banking 
supervisors began to issue guidance in the late 1990s to better refine what 
constitutes CSI and how the agencies expect that information to be 
treated.28  Agency guidance was later codified by the agencies in their 
regulations, but the agencies diverged in the degree to which they granted 
banks authority to divulge CSI.   
In addition, the agencies issued the 2005 Interagency Advisory,29 
which predated the CFPB.  This advisory was prompted specifically by 
agency concerns about insurers requesting or requiring banks to provide 
their CAMELS ratings in the context of underwriting directors and 
officers liability (“D&O”) policies.  The 2005 Interagency Advisory 
generally referenced existing agency rules regarding disclosure of CSI, 
emphasized the importance of those rules, and pointed to a range of 
public sources of information about banks, such as Call Reports and 
Thrift Financial Reports, Uniform Bank Performance Reports, SEC 
filings, rating agency reports, and public enforcement actions as 
alternatives to disclosure of CAMELS ratings or other CSI.30   
Collectively, these efforts have established a number of 
fundamental principles in understanding CSI.  First, CSI is the property 
of the agency, not the supervised institution, and the agency has the power 
to permit or deny its use or disclosure for any purpose.31  Second, 
 
 28. See e.g., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., CIRCULAR NO. 11002, IMPROPER DISCLOSURE 
OF CONFIDENTIAL SUPERVISORY INFORMATION BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1997) 
(interestingly, this circular was not issued by the Board, but rather by its delegee, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York); FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., SARC-99-07, APPEALS OF MATERIAL 
SUPERVISORY DETERMINATIONS:  GUIDELINES & DECISIONS (1999) (finding that a bank had 
violated FDIC rules when the bank provided members of Congress and the General 
Accounting Office with copies of its appeal of an examination rating). 
 29. See 2005 INTERAGENCY ADVISORY, supra note 25. 
 30. Subsequent developments have expanded this list.  For example, the Dodd-Frank Act 
required public disclosures of certain larger banks’ “living wills,” as well as annual 
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (“CCAR”) and other stress test results. 
 31. This principle has been codified by the agencies.  12 C.F.R. §§ 4.32(b)(2), 4.36 (2017) 
(OCC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 309.5(g)(8), 309.6(a), 350.9 (2017) (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 261.2(c)(1), 
261.20(g), 261.22(e) (Board); 12 C.F.R. § 792.30 (NCUA). 
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supervisory ratings, such as the CAMELS, RFI/C, or ROCA ratings, are 
sacrosanct, and exam reports are of equal rank.32  Third, the agencies will 
respond collectively to issues of common import, such as the demands of 
insurers for CSI, in order to provide “cover” to banks under pressure to 
provide CSI to third parties. 
However, rules pertaining to permitted disclosures of CSI vary in 
material ways among the agencies, and more recent rules from the CFPB 
have altered the landscape.  Again, recent civil and criminal enforcement 
actions have brought into focus how and whether any institution can 
assure compliance with the agencies’ divergent standards.  Given the 
blurring of lines among the supervisory authority of the agencies, in 
particular for larger institutions, these distinctions may require them to 
accept the lowest common denominator, which may constrain the 
flexibility of the permitted business use of CSI in unnecessary and 
potentially costly ways.   
1. The Board’s Rules 
Below are key points of the Board’s rules that guide a Board-
supervised institution in determining whether and when disclosure of CSI 
is permitted.  The Board explicitly permits a bank to provide CSI “to its 
directors, officers, and employees, and to its parent bank holding 
company or parent savings and loan holding company and its directors, 
officers, and employees.”33  The Board also permits a bank to provide CSI 
to any certified public accountant or legal counsel employed by the 
supervised financial institution, subject to certain conditions, including 
 
 32. Note that not every supervisor has held fast to this principle.  In 2012, the North 
Carolina Credit Union Division permitted a state credit union to disclose its supervisory 
rating.  In response, the NCUA suspended joint examinations with the state agency for a 
period of time, forcing North Carolina credit unions to submit to separate examinations.  
CREDIT UNION NAT’L ASS’N, NEW:  NCUA TO STOP SEPARATE EXAMS IN N.C. (2013), http://
news.cuna.org/articles/print/NEW:_NCUA_to_stop_separate_exams_in_NC. 
 33. 12 C.F.R. § 261.20(b) (2017) (emphasis added).  The Board also provides specific 
rules governing disclosures of CSI by the Board to supervised institutions and to federal and 
state supervisory agencies, and to law enforcement, among other specific instances.  See 12 
C.F.R. §§ 261.20(a), (c) (2017) (discussing disclosure of confidential supervisory information 
to supervised financial institutions and disclosure upon request to Federal financial institution 
supervisory agencies); 12 C.F.R. § 261 (2017).  The Board states that CSI is considered 
privileged information that it will not normally provide to the public, and provides rules 
governing when it would produce CSI in a litigation context or subject to a subpoena or other 
process.  See 12 C.F.R. §§ 261.22, 261.23 (2017) (setting requirements in other circumstances 
of disclosure). 
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that these advisors may review CSI only on the premises of the supervised 
financial institution, and shall not make or retain any copies of such 
information, and may not make any further disclosure of the CSI except 
upon prior written approval of the Board’s General Counsel, except as 
necessary to provide advice to the bank.34  The Board’s rules state further 
that “[n]o person obtaining access to confidential supervisory 
information pursuant to this section may make a personal copy of any 
such information; and no person may remove confidential supervisory 
information from the premises of the institution or agency in possession 
of such information except as permitted by specific language in this 
regulation or by the Board.”35  
As recently as 2013, largely reiterating the 2005 Interagency 
Advisory, the Board summarized and reinforced its warnings to 
community banks to ensure appropriate treatment of CSI, as follows: 
 
OK to Disclose: 
 
• Directors, officers, employees 
 
• Parent company directors, officers, employees 
 
• Certified public accountant (subject to limitations) 
 
• Legal counsel (subject to limitations) 
 










 34. Id. 
 35. 12 C.F.R. § 261.20(g) (2017).  While not explicit, a fair reading of this rule is that it 
does not constrain the specific disclosures of CSI to legal counsel and CPAs, such that 
approval of the Board’s General Counsel is not, for example, required for an outside lawyer 
to review a bank’s exam reports on its premises. 
  
2018] COHERENT AND CONSISTENT TREATMENT OF CSI 55 
 
• Rating agencies 
 
• General public 
 
• Potential acquirers36 
 
The Board has required, since at least 1988, that certified public 
accountants and legal counsel may only access CSI “on the premises” of 
the supervised institution.37  This means that, without specific permission, 
a Board-supervised institution may not reveal “matters requiring 
attention” or citations of legal violations for which the institution may 
require legal advice, unless the lawyer is on site at an office of the 
institution.  While conceivably an outside lawyer may review electronic 
documents containing CSI, according to this rule, the lawyer may only 
do so at a computer that is “on the premises” of the supervised institution.  
The Board’s pre-email and pre-Internet rule, while clearly intended to 
maintain custody and control of paper documents, does not reflect the 
modern reality of secure email, protected data rooms, and other 
mechanisms for sharing CSI with legal counsel or a CPA.38  Because the 
Board’s rule also restricts making or retaining “copies” of CSI—defined 
to include any information derived from exam reports—the Board could 
also sanction a bank, and its legal counsel or CPA, if memoranda or 
analyses of legal or accounting concerns include references to CSI, as 
broadly defined.  Further, “copies” of that information would be made as 
a matter of course as files are shared (within the sanctioned relationship 
with counsel or the CPA).  On their face, the Board’s rules also would 
seem to prohibit a law firm from retaining records of privileged attorney-
client discourse that contains CSI.   
 
 36. See CMTY. BANKING CONNECTIONS, CONFIDENTIAL SUPERVISORY INFORMATION 
DISCLOSURE RULES (2013), https://communitybankingconnections.org/articles/2013/Q1/Co 
nfidential-Supervisory-Information-Disclosure-Rules.  Certain points of this guidance are 
further discussed below (“The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) 
has published rules regarding the disclosure of confidential supervisory information by 
financial institutions supervised by the Federal Reserve.”). 
 37. See 53 Fed. Reg. 20815 (June 7, 1988). 
 38. The Board had opportunities in subsequent rounds of updates to this rule to address 
this anachronism, but has not done so.  See 62 Fed. Reg. 54359 (Oct. 20, 1997); 76 Fed. Reg. 
56601 (Sept. 13, 2011); 79 Fed. Reg. 6077 (Feb. 3, 2014). 
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Moreover, this limitation is incongruent with the statutory 
requirement that an insured state member bank “shall transmit” a copy of 
its most recent examination report and any non-public enforcement action 
to its external auditor.39  Further, the Board, along with the other 
prudential agencies, have long indicated, that banks “should provide 
[external auditors] with access to all examination reports and written 
communication between the institution and the agencies or state bank 
supervisor since the last external auditing activity.”40 
Similarly, the Board’s rules do not permit disclosure of CSI to 
other advisors that are not legal counsel or public accountants.  In recent 
years, a variety of consulting firms have evolved into key resources for 
banks addressing complex regulatory concerns and compliance matters.  
In some instances, these consulting firms are hired by legal counsel, 
establishing legal privilege protections for the work of the consultants.  
However, the Board’s rule does not permit direct disclosure of CSI by a 
bank to its consultants, and prohibits disclosure of CSI by lawyers or 
CPAs to those consultants “without the prior written approval of the 
Board’s General Counsel except as necessary to provide advice to the 
supervised financial institution, its parent bank holding company, or the 
officers, directors, and employees of such supervised financial institution 
and parent bank holding company.”   
The Board’s rule permits disclosure of CSI by a bank to its parent 
holding company, but not to other affiliates.  For example, information 
necessary to enable a holding company to develop an enterprise-wide 
view of the company’s risks can include CSI.  However, it is unclear 
whether the results of that risk analysis, increasingly expected of nearly 
every bank holding company by the Board as a supervisory matter, can 
be provided to the non-bank sister affiliates of the bank, unless the 
 
 39. 12 U.S.C. § 1831m(h) (2016).  This statute was added by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (“FDICIA”) in 1991.  Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236. 
 40. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. ET AL., INTERAGENCY POLICY 
STATEMENT ON EXTERNAL AUDITING PROGRAMS OF BANKS AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS 
(1999) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).  The policy statement encourages disclosure 
of any supervisory MOU, written agreements, administrative orders, reports of action initiated 
by a federal or state banking agency, and any proposed or ordered assessments of civil money 
penalties against the institution or an institution-related party, as well as any associated 
correspondence.  The auditor must maintain the confidentiality of examination reports and 
other confidential supervisory information. Also, the engagement letter should grant 
examiners access to all the accountant’s or auditor’s workpapers and other material pertaining 
to the institution prepared in the course of performing the external audit. 
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analysis is not derived from or related to CSI.  Further, the Board’s rules 
also would not permit CSI to be disclosed to insurers for important 
insurance coverage such as D&O policies, including to provide a notice 
of circumstances in order to preserve rights of claims against the policy.   
2. The OCC’s Rules 
Below are key points of the OCC’s rules that guide an OCC-
supervised institution in determining whether and when a disclosure of 
CSI is permitted.  First, while impliedly permitted by the rule, there is no 
express provision permitting an OCC-supervised bank to disclose CSI to 
its holding company, in contrast with the Board’s rules and the rules of 
the FDIC, described below.  On the other hand, the OCC expressly 
permits disclosures “when necessary or appropriate for business 
purposes” to “a person or organization officially connected with the bank 
or Federal savings association as officer, director, employee, attorney, 
auditor, or independent auditor.”41  Further, the OCC permits disclosure 
of CSI to consultants, subject to a non-disclosure agreement meeting 
prescribed terms.  There are no restrictions in the OCC’s rules on making 
such disclosures only on the premises of the bank, or subject to 
limitations on retention of copies, as in the Board’s rules.    
3. The FDIC’s Rules 
The FDIC provides detailed rules for limited disclosure of its CSI 
pertaining to disclosure by the FDIC itself in its various capacities, but 
these rules provide only limited flexibility with regard to a bank’s ability 
to share CSI with third parties without permission of the FDIC.42  In 
general, the FDIC will provide directors, officers, employees, or agents 
of the regulated entity access to CSI in the performance of their official 
duties.  However, the authorization provided by the FDIC’s regulation 
does not extend, for example, to an officer of the bank providing CSI to 
any agent, such as a lawyer hired by the bank or its external auditor, if 
not authorized by the FDIC itself.  Despite the FDIC’s restriction, as 
noted above with regard to the Board’s rules, federal statutes require that 
insured banks “shall transmit” copies of examination reports and other 
 
 41. 12 C.F.R. § 4.37(b)(2) (2017). 
 42. 12 C.F.R. § 309.6 (2017). 
  
58 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 22 
CSI to their external auditors, and this was reinforced by interagency 
policy.43 
Unlike the other agencies, the FDIC has a highly prescriptive rule 
that permits disclosure of FDIC exam reports to the bank’s parent holding 
company and its directors, officers, and employees.  Requirements 
include that the parent must own 50% of the bank’s voting stock, the bank 
board of directors must annually resolve, in a prescribed manner, to 
authorize the reproduction and furnishing of reports, and the minutes 
must record certain information pertaining to the disclosure.44  As noted 
above, the Board’s rules authorize disclosure, and the OCC only 
impliedly authorizes disclosure.  Neither of these agencies have the same 
prescribed standards as the FDIC. 
Notably, unlike other agencies, the FDIC does not provide for the 
disclosure of CSI by a bank to its lawyers, consultants, or service 
providers, without permission of the agency.  The FDIC has been 
particularly sensitive in the context of its receivership role for troubled or 
failing banks.  In 2012, the FDIC issued guidance stating that it is a breach 
of fiduciary duty, and a violation of FDIC regulations, for directors and 
officers, and their lawyers, to copy and remove CSI and other financial 
institution records in anticipation of litigation or an enforcement action 
against that director or officer in his or her personal capacity.45 
 
 43. 12 U.S.C. § 1831m(h) (2016).  This statute was added by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (“FDICIA”) in 1991.  Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236. 
 44. 12 C.F.R. § 309.6(b)(7)(iii) (2017).  The FDIC’s rules for disclosure of CSI to parent 
holding companies do not provide for disclosure to any non-bank sister affiliates of the bank.  
See id. (permitting subsidiary depository institutions to furnish examination reports to the 
parent holding company without prior approval). 
 45. See Letter from the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. on Guidelines Regarding the Copying 
and Removal of Confidential Financial Institution Information (Mar. 19, 2012) (reminding 
that removal of supervisory records in anticipation of litigation or enforcement is a breach of 
fiduciary duty).  This guidance was issued following the FDIC’s lawsuits, as receiver, against 
law firms and a bank’s holding company for having removed records of a failing bank.  Id.; 
see, e.g., FDIC v. Bryan Cave, LLP, No. 10-CV-03666 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (discussing that the 
FDIC alleged that bank officers and directors provided the law firm with copies of the bank’s 
books and records to aid in their defense, in violation of federal laws, internal bank policies, 
and in some cases written agreements by copying the documents and providing those copies 
to counsel. The FDIC ultimately dismissed its case after a private settlement).  The FDIC has 
asserted that “[p]ursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A), the FDIC as receiver obtains the 
exclusive rights and benefits associated with the failed institution’s documents and records.”  
Letter from Michael Krimminger, Acting Gen. Counsel, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., to David 
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4. The CFPB’s Rules 
As the newest agency on the block, the CFPB’s current rules 
provide both the most clearly defined and the most permissive rules of 
those surveyed with regard to the permitted use and disclosure of CSI that 
belongs to the CFPB.46  The CFPB provides the most definitional 
certainty and operational flexibility of any of the agencies with regard to 
use and disclosure of CSI.  Affiliates, lawyers, contractors, consultants, 
and “service providers” are all permitted to obtain CSI as necessary to 
provide advice or services to the institution.  Further, unlike any of the 
other agencies, the CFPB’s rules explicitly permit disclosure to directors, 
officers, and employees of all affiliates “to the extent that the disclosure 
of such CSI is relevant to the performance of such individuals’ assigned 
duties.”47  In turn, these affiliates may also disclose CSI to CPAs, 
lawyers, contractors, consultants, or service providers.   
Instead of requiring prior permission in these instances, the CFPB 
permits disclosure unless otherwise directed by the agency, and imposes 
requirements on the recipients of the CSI.  The recipient may not “utilize, 
make, or retain copies of, or disclose CSI for any purpose, except as is 
necessary to provide advice or services to the supervised financial 
institution or its affiliate.”48  This approach allows, for example, a bank 
to include restrictions on the use of CSI in the form of non-disclosure 
terms in services contracts, rather than having to seek prior approval of 
senior staff of the agency.  These provisions perhaps reflect that modern 
banks need the services of third parties, often on an expedited basis, and 
that these institutions are part of larger organizations with consolidated 
operations and risk management needs.   
While the CFPB’s rules are notable for their clarity and utility, 
the CFPB has also proposed a controversial loosening of its rules with 
regard to sharing of CSI by the CFPB with non-supervisory agencies, 
such as state attorneys general.49  This proposal received significant 
industry response, including concerns about the chilling effect that such 
disclosure would have on the confidential supervisory relationship and 
 
 46. See 12 C.F.R. § 1070.42(b) (2017) (discussing disclosure of confidential supervisory 
information by a supervised financial institution or its affiliates). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Amendments Relating to Disclosure of Records and Information, 81 Fed. Reg. 58310 
(Aug. 24, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Pts. 1070 and 1091). 
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the potential waiver of legal privilege.50  As of the close of 2017, the 
CFPB has not finalized its proposed rule. 
III. ILLUSTRATIVE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE AGENCIES’ CSI 
REGIME 
In considering the landscape above, there are a range of practical 
issues that arise with regard to the definition and use of CSI.  A list of 
those issues includes, but is not limited to, the following: 
 
• When can a bank reveal CSI of one agency to another agency?  For 
example, if an on-site examiner demands to see the responses of the 
bank to supervisory “matters requiring attention” issued by another 
agency. 
 
• In a joint exam by state and federal prudential supervisors, which 
agency’s rules govern the treatment of CSI? 
 
• In an examination of a third-party service provider by the FFIEC 
under its authority pursuant to the Bank Service Company Act, 
which agency’s definitions and rules govern? 
 
• How should a bank track, label, and maintain CSI?  Is this a risk 
governance issue, a legal issue, an information security issue?  
Should the bank maintain labels, or header/footer legends, to identify 
CSI?  What should those legends say?  How should CSI information 
be maintained when it may also be subject to legal privilege, to 
private non-disclosure agreements, or to FOIA exemptions?  Should 
institutions establish compliance programs that ensure they meet the 
standards emerging from the Goldman Sachs Order?51 
 
 50. See, e.g., Letter from The Clearing House, et al., to Monica Jackson, Office of the 
Exec. Sec’y, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=CFPB-2016-0039-0013 (“We appreciate the Bureau’s recognition of the 
importance of providing maximum protection to sensitive information and its efforts to 
provide additional clarity and transparency regarding its information protection and disclosure 
practices.  However, we believe that certain of the Bureau’s proposed amendments would 
inappropriately and unnecessarily expand the universe of entities that could receive protected 
information.”). 
 51. See The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Nos. 16-011-BH-C, 16-011-CMP-HC (Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Aug. 2, 2016) (“[T]he Firm lacked adequate policies and 
procedures designed to detect or prevent the unauthorized dissemination and use of 
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• What should a bank do when it receives unsolicited CSI from a third 
party?  For example, what if an applicant for a job at the bank 
references work history that included remediation of non-public 
supervisory concerns at another bank? 
 
• If the bank has entered into a non-disclosure agreement with a third 
party, the agencies have asserted that such agreements should not 
impede supervisory access to such information.52  Further, the Board 
has asserted that “identification of information requested by, or 
provided to, supervisory staff—including the fact that an 
examination has taken or will take place—is related to an 
examination and falls within the definition of confidential 
supervisory information.”53  In this case, the bank must ensure that 
non-disclosure agreements expressly permit access by their 
supervisors to confidential information shared by third parties.  This 
access can create friction in negotiations. 
 
• For publicly traded institutions, tensions may be created between 
restrictions on disclosure of CSI and securities law disclosure 
requirements.  Many publicly traded banks feel obliged by the 
securities laws to pre-emptively disclose the impact of their 
regulatory status in securities filings.  While the bank cannot reveal 
its CAMELS composite, RFI/C, compliance or other ratings, it may 
feel compelled by the securities laws to describe the effect of any 
memorandum of understanding or other non-public enforcement 
order on matters important to shareholders, such as limitations on 
dividends or debt.  Surprisingly, the agencies have not issued any 
 
confidential supervisory information belonging to the Board of Governors and other banking 
regulators, which resulted in legal and reputational risks to the Firm. . . .”). 
 52. See, e.g., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Supervision and Regulation 
Letter on Confidentiality Provisions in Third-Party Agreements (Dec. 13, 2007) (“It is 
contrary to Federal Reserve regulation and policy for agreements to contain confidentiality 
provisions that (1) restrict the banking organization from providing information to Federal 
Reserve supervisory staff; (2) require or permit, without the prior approval of the Federal 
Reserve, the banking organization to disclose to a counterparty that any information will be 
or was provided to Federal Reserve supervisory staff; or (3) require or permit, without the 
prior approval of the Federal Reserve, the banking organization to inform a counterparty of a 
current or upcoming Federal Reserve examination or any nonpublic Federal Reserve 
supervisory initiative or action.”). 
 53. Id. 
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clarifying guidance on this issue, despite its impact on a wide range 
of firms. 
 
• In the context of any bank merger or acquisition, appropriate 
diligence naturally includes a review of the regulatory status of the 
partner, its compliance and risk management systems, and other 
areas not immediately apparent from a review of the financial 
statements.54  The acquirer or resulting bank wants to be sure it is not 
assuming a set of problems that can undermine the value of the deal.  
The target wants some assurance that the acquirer can complete the 
transaction as it requires regulatory approval.  While there is 
substantial information publicly available, and even though deal 
diligence is always pursued pursuant to non-disclosure agreements, 
where CSI is so broadly defined to include information “derived 
from or related to” examination materials there is a delicate dance 
required to ensure that appropriate diligence can be accomplished.55 
IV. DO MARKET SIGNALS AND PERMITTED DISCLOSURES UNDERMINE 
THE PROTECTIVE REGIME FOR CSI? 
While the agencies have expressed substantial interest in 
maintaining the secrecy of a bank’s ratings, justifying an entire regime of 
protection for CSI, increasingly the regulatory status of an institution can 
be deduced from its behavior and by public regulatory sanctions.  Some 
may argue that the composite CAMELS or compliance ratings of a bank 
are an open secret.  Banks with a “4” or “5” composite CAMELS rating 
typically face a public enforcement action.  The market also can often 
deduce when banks have a composite CAMELS rating of “3” or a 
subjective management rating of “3,” as these institutions will typically 
have to stay on the sidelines for any “expansionary” activity, including 
not only mergers and acquisitions, but also any branching activity.  The 
 
 54. This same diligence is appropriate for underwriters of a securities offering. 
 55. Notably, an assessment of the thoroughness of due diligence is an element of 
regulatory approval of an application.  Question #3 of the Board’s FR Y-3 reporting form 
(used for applications under Section 3 of the Bank Holding Company Act), states:  “If the 
proposed transaction involves the acquisition of an unaffiliated banking operation or 
otherwise represents a change in ownership of established banking operations, describe 
briefly the due diligence review conducted on the target operations by Applicant.  Indicate the 
scope of and resources committed to the review, explain any significant adverse findings, and 
describe the corrective action(s) to be taken to address those weaknesses.” 
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Board has made this policy explicit, and the OCC and FDIC have 
typically followed the same approach.56   
While other factors, such as open investigations of consumer 
compliance concerns, may constrain expansionary activity, even for 
satisfactorily-rated institutions, the effect is the same, in that confidential 
supervisory discussions may be revealed by their known market impact 
on the supervised institution.  Once filed and publicly noticed, 
withdrawals of applications or licensing matters are also publicly known, 
and provide market signals on an institution’s supervisory status.  In other 
words, the agencies use the blunt lever of enforcement actions, forced 
withdrawals or slowed processes for expansionary proposals, and other 
tools to drive banks to act upon supervisory concerns.  As a result, in 
some instances the agencies themselves are revealing significant 
information about an institution’s supervisory status, while 
simultaneously constraining the bank’s ability to address with clarity, in 
a public manner, its efforts to address those concerns, as that information 
may be considered CSI.  
V. OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM 
Among the goals for regulatory reform should be the 
reconciliation of the disparate treatment of CSI by and among the 
agencies, to modernize rules, and to provide greater clarity to banks and 
others on the definitions and permissible usage of CSI.57  Interagency 
 
 56. See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Supervision and Regulation Letter on 
Enhancing Transparency in the Federal Reserve’s Applications Process (Feb. 24, 2014), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1402.htm (“To enhance 
transparency in the Federal Reserve’s applications process and provide the banking industry 
and general public with better insight into the issues that could prevent the Federal Reserve 
from acting favorably on a proposal, the Federal Reserve will start publishing a semi-annual 
report that provides pertinent information on applications and notices filed with the Federal 
Reserve.”).  There are exceptions to the Board’ general stance.  For example, the Board allows 
expansionary proposals for banks with less than satisfactory safety and soundness ratings only 
upon:  (1) convincingly demonstrating that the proposal would not distract management from 
addressing the existing problems of the organization or further exacerbate these problems, (2) 
demonstrating that the proposed acquisition would strengthen the organization, and (3) 
responding appropriately to and making notable progress in addressing supervisory concerns. 
 57. Others have pointed out procedural matters adjunct to the supervisory process that 
are similarly disparate and ripe for reform or harmonization, such as the appeal processes 
among the agencies for review of material supervisory determinations.  See Julie Andersen 
Hill, When Bank Examiners Get It Wrong:  Financial Institution Appeals of Material 
Supervisory Determinations, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1101 (2015) (analyzing the appeals 
processes for material supervisory determinations made by regulators). 
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collaboration to rectify this lack of clarity should be in the interest of the 
agencies themselves.  Doing so would provide better clarity and 
transparency to all interested parties and remove unnecessary concerns 
that can impede the free-flow of information between regulators and 
regulated institutions necessary to both effective supervision and to the 
operations of the supervised bank.  Unless required by Congress or as 
necessary given the unique powers or authority of the agency, rules 
governing the treatment of CSI should be as consistent as possible.  To 
further the goal of confidentiality and candor to enable agencies to 
effectively supervise banks, the treatment of CSI should not be more or 
less stringent depending upon the choice of primary federal regulator.  In 
addition, the treatment of CSI by the CFPB should be consistent with the 
treatment of such information by the prudential regulators, again except 
to the extent that the unique role and powers of the CFPB or the prudential 
agency dictate otherwise.  Moreover, standards of interpretation of 
treatment of CSI should not be left to “agency policy” that is not set forth 
in law and regulation, or at a minimum set forth in interagency regulatory 
guidance.   
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) issued a 
study in 2016 (“GAO Report” or “Report”) that found that 
“fragmentation and overlap have created inefficiencies in regulatory 
processes, inconsistencies in how regulators oversee similar types of 
institutions, and differences in the levels of protection afforded to 
consumers.”58  The Report encourages efforts by Congress to rectify 
these concerns.  However, as the GAO Report points out, given the 
complex, overlapping, and fragmented nature of the U.S. regulatory 
system, reconciliation of competing interests among the agencies may 
require a mandate from Congress as an impetus to force the agencies to 
take action.  The GAO Report also describes how legal constraints affect 
interagency sharing of confidential information to achieve the systemic 
risk monitoring and analysis goals set by the Dodd-Frank Act, which 
created the Office of Financial Regulation and the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council to achieve those goals.  In other words, inconsistent 
standards for definitions and treatment of CSI not only impact supervised 
 
 58. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-175, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL 
REQUESTERS:  COMPLEX AND FRAGMENTED STRUCTURE COULD BE STREAMLINED TO IMPROVE 
EFFECTIVENESS (2016) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
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institutions, but also disrupt the government’s ability to achieve its 
systemic oversight goals in a collaborative manner.59   
Some have recommended an open dialogue among regulators, the 
regulated, and industry professionals, such as lawyers, consultants, and 
accountants, to facilitate a more consistent understanding of the definition 
and use of CSI.60  These commentators also recommend reforms 
including:  (1) having the prudential bank regulators adopt the CFPB’s 
standard for sharing CSI with lawyers and other advisors as a practical 
step; (2) providing a common and streamlined approach to obtaining 
approvals for routine disclosures; and (3) taking into account the role of 
attorney-client privilege as an overlapping protection and justification for 
permitted disclosures.61 
Moreover, in 1979, Congress established the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examinations Council (“FFIEC”) “to prescribe uniform 
principles and standards for the Federal examination of financial 
institutions . . . and make recommendations to promote uniformity in the 
supervision of these financial institutions.”62  From the FFIEC came the 
CAMELS rating system, schools for examiner training across agencies, 
and other interagency efforts.  It seems that the FFIEC could also be an 
appropriate entity to reconcile disparate and in some cases outmoded 
approaches to the definition and treatment of CSI, which is so important 
to effective bank supervision. 
In summary, the banking agencies have elevated the importance 
of the treatment of CSI by emphasizing concerns in enforcement actions 
and by issuing guidance and rules, but have not provided consistent and 
coherent definitions and guidance across the industry.  Reform of these 
 
 59. See GAO REPORT, supra note 57, at 68–75 (“[I]f the nature of open participation of 
FSOC member agency staff at the Systemic Risk Committee presents serious impediments to 
meaningful sharing and discussion of confidential supervisory and other information, other 
arrangements may help overcome such impediments.  OFR staff said that although legal 
constraints preclude them from sharing some monitors’ underlying data widely at the 
Systemic Risk Committee, they could share this information with a small group, as they have 
done in other settings.”).  At a minimum, such an approach leads to effectively unappealable 
agency action.  See Greg Baer, Rethinking Safety and Soundness Supervision, THE CLEARING 
HOUSE BANKING PERSPECTIVES, Q3 2017, https://www.theclearinghouse.org/research/
banking-perspectives/2017/2017-q3-banking-perspectives/safety-and-soundness-supervision 
(recommending modernization of the supervision system). 
 60. Edward P. O’Keefe, et al., Navigating the Complexities of CSI, THE CLEARING HOUSE 
BANKING PERSPECTIVES, Q1 2017, https://www.theclearinghouse.org/research/banking-
perspectives/2017/2017-q1-banking-perspectives/csi-complexities. 
 61. Id. 
 62. 12 U.S.C. § 3301 (2016).   
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rules would remove unnecessary uncertainty and friction, and help foster 
the transparent and candid dialogue critical to effective bank supervision. 
 
